The election issue nobody campaigned on: who controls New Zealand’s off switch?
Friday the 13th, and nobody even meant it
New Zealand started Friday 13 November without Outlook, Teams or Copilot. A Microsoft 365 failure that began on Thursday afternoon in the United States rolled straight into our working day, and agencies and businesses here fell back on manual workarounds until service returned on the 14th. By one count, it was the fifth major Microsoft 365 outage of 2026.
Nobody attacked us and nobody made a decision about us. Microsoft says a process on its servers simply became overwhelmed, and a meaningful slice of Aotearoa's working life stopped because of a load problem on the other side of the world. Now imagine the same thing happening on purpose.
That isn't hypothetical. In 2025, after the United States sanctioned the International Criminal Court's chief prosecutor, Karim Khan, he lost access to his Microsoft email and moved to a Swiss provider. Microsoft disputes parts of that account, but Europe has been talking about a digital "kill switch" ever since, and we should be too.
We already have the framework
Here's the irony. While Europe scrambles to define digital sovereignty, Aotearoa has had a mature version of it for a decade. Te Mana Raraunga, the Māori Data Sovereignty Network, was founded in 2016 on the principle that data is a taonga, and that the people it relates to have an inherent right to govern it. Its principles begin with rangatiratanga, authority and control, and treat data as something to care for across generations rather than a resource to extract.
Māori data leaders have warned about offshoring for years. In 2022, Te Kāhui Raraunga, the operational arm of the Data Iwi Leaders Group, challenged the government's push to move public data offshore and called for investment in local options instead. They argued this was about all New Zealanders' data, and that Māori, as Tiriti partners, belonged in those decisions. If we'd listened then, we'd be well ahead now, with a foundation grounded in Te Tiriti rather than borrowed from Brussels.
Europe has stopped talking and started moving
In January, France announced that its public service will drop Microsoft Teams and Zoom by 2027 in favour of Visio, a homegrown open-source platform hosted on French infrastructure. Austria's armed forces moved 16,000 workstations off Microsoft Office in 2025 so that critical data would be processed within the country, and the German state of Schleswig-Holstein is migrating its government away from Microsoft entirely. In June, the European Commission proposed a Tech Sovereignty Package that sorts public cloud and AI procurement into sovereignty tiers.
It hasn't all been smooth. Schleswig-Holstein's email migration misrouted messages, and Denmark's digitalisation ministry scaled back its own pilot after staff hit formatting problems. But the direction is unmistakable, and digital sovereignty is fast becoming industrial policy.
Why this matters more for us
Europe's worries come down to three things. There's the kill switch, where a foreign government gains leverage over services you can't live without. There's legal reach: under the US CLOUD Act, American authorities can compel US-owned providers to hand over data held anywhere, so a server in Auckland doesn't settle the question, because data residency is not data sovereignty. And there's concentration, which last week demonstrated perfectly.
New Zealand is more exposed than most. We adopted a Cloud First policy for government in 2012 and strengthened it in 2023, and all but one of the eight companies with all-of-government cloud agreements are from overseas, mostly the United States. Yet digital policy barely registered in the election campaign. Whoever forms the next government, this belongs alongside energy and food security as a question of national resilience.
What we can do
Nobody sensible is suggesting we rip out Microsoft on Monday, and Denmark's stumbles show the cost of rushing. The goal is to make dependence a deliberate choice with a plan B, not an accident we discover mid-outage. For government, that means building sovereignty tiers into how it buys technology, partnering on Europe's open-source public sector tools (our EU data adequacy status and Horizon Europe membership help here), backing local providers, and putting Māori at the table as Tiriti partners from the start.
If you lead an organisation or sit on a board
Map which critical functions rely on a single provider, and ask what happens if it's gone for 48 hours.
Test a fallback for email, payments and customer contact.
Ask your providers who ultimately owns them and which foreign laws can reach your data.
If you hold data about Māori, read the Te Mana Raraunga principles and talk to the people it relates to.
If you're a New Zealander who cares about this
Ask your MP and the incoming government what their digital sovereignty plan is.
Keep a local copy of the documents and photos you can't afford to lose.
The question we keep not asking
We've long told ourselves that being small and far away protects us. Digitally, it's the opposite, because it leaves us more dependent on infrastructure we don't control. Last Friday cost us a day of email, and the next disruption might not be an accident.
Europe has decided that relying on someone else's off switch isn't good enough. It's time New Zealand asked the same question out loud: who holds the off switch for Aotearoa, and why isn't it us?





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